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I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most striking recent developments in sexual offence policy has
been the proliferation of affirmative consent policies. These policies vary
in their details but share the common theme of prohibiting sexual activity
with someone who has not acted in a way that expresses their consent.
Yale University’s is a representative example:
Sexual activity requires consent, which is defined as positive, unambig-
uous, and voluntary agreement to engage in specific sexual activity
throughout a sexual encounter. Consent cannot be inferred from the
absence of a “no”; a clear “yes,” verbal or otherwise, is necessary.
While a decade ago, affirmative consent definitions were rare, nowadays
they feature in the campus codes of over 1,400 universities in the United
States.1 However, the criminal law has mostly bucked this trend. In the
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1. The statistic is from the National Center for Higher Education Risk Management as
quoted by Deborah Tuerkheimer in her “Affirmative Consent,” Ohio State Journal of Criminal
Law 13 (2016): 441–68. Besides the issue of how to define consent, there are other debates
about how these policies should be framed, for example, to protect respondents and afford
complainants due process. Should complaints be adjudicated on the basis of a preponderance
of evidence standard or a beyond reasonable doubt standard? Should respondents have a
right to have an attorney present and the right to cross-examine witnesses, including
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United States, a few states’ rape law does include an affirmative consent
definition, and one was considered in the ongoing revisions to the Ameri-
can Law Institute’s Model Penal Code.2 But these revisions ended up
defining consent in terms of someone’s willingness to engage in sexual
activity.3 On that definition, someone’s communicative behavior is rele-
vant only as evidence about what they are willing to do.
Insofar as affirmative consent policies have received philosophical
attention in print, this has occurred in the context of a longer standing
debate about what is required for morally valid consent.4 In a formidable
complainants? For a discussion surveying concerns, see Erin Collins, “The Criminalization of
Title IX,” Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law 13 (2016): 365–95, at p. 378.
2. Tuerkheimer describes these states’ laws as follows:
In Wisconsin, consent “means words or overt actions by a person who is competent
to give informed consent indicating a freely given agreement to have sexual inter-
course or sexual contact.” … In Vermont, consent “means words or actions by a per-
son indicating a voluntary agreement to engage in a sexual act.” …Finally, in New
Jersey, the definition of affirmative consent is found not in the statute itself, but in the
state Supreme Court’s interpretation of it. In the much-discussed case of State of New
Jersey in the Interest of M.T.S., the court held that consent requires “permission to
engage in sexual penetration [that] must be affirmative and it must be given freely.
Tuerkheimer, “Affirmative Consent,” p. 451, respectively citing WIS. STAT. ANN. §
940.225(4), VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3251(3), and State ex rel. M. T. S., 609 A.2d 1266,
1277 (N.J. 1992).
3. The model penal code is formulated by the American Law Institute (ALI). Stephen
Schulhofer and Erin Murphy had the responsibility of proposing revisions to the code’s
Section 213, which concerns sexual offenses. This had been last updated in 1962. As well as
felonies, with maximum sentences ranging from 10 years to life imprisonment, successive
drafts included a misdemeanor of “sexual intercourse without consent,” with maximum
imprisonment of 1 year, where consent was defined as “a person’s positive agreement, com-
municated by either words or actions, to engage in sexual intercourse or sexual contact.” This
proposal was rejected by the ALI Council at the 2016 annual meeting of the ALI. Instead, con-
sent was defined as “a person’s willingness to engage in a specific act of sexual penetration
or sexual contact.” Jennifer Moringo, “Updated ‘Consent’ Definition, December 19, 2016,
http://www.thealiadviser.org/sexual-assault/updated-consent-definition/ https://www.ali.org/
projects/show/sexual-assault-and-related-offenses/. Accessed April 1, 2017.
4. In an excellent essay that is currently undergoing revision, Alexander Guerrero defends
affirmative consent policies on epistemic grounds. Drawing on recent work in epistemology,
Guerrero argues that because sexual consent is particularly important, an agent needs a sig-
nificant amount of evidence of their partner’s consent in order either to justifiably believe
that their partner consents or to non-culpably act on their belief that their partner consents.
While I have not been able to engage with Guerrero’s essay at the length that it deserves,
I note that our accounts are importantly similar in that both defend evidence-based ratio-
nales for affirmative consent policies, while remaining neutral about whether a mental choice
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critique of these policies, Kimberly Ferzan has defended the “Mental
View” that valid consent requires only an inner mental choice or inten-
tion.5 According to this view, so long as uncommunicative sexual partners
have made these choices, each would act permissibly. But an encounter
without communication would be a sexual offence according to affirma-
tive consent policies, and this concerns Ferzan:
If…potential defendants are punished in order to cause social change or
to protect women by creating prophylactic rules, then we are punishing
individuals who are nonculpable as to what we really care about (noncon-
sensual sex) in order to accomplish our goal (better and more accurate
communication about consent). We are punishing the morally innocent.
We should pause before punishing the innocent for the collective good.6
But the Mental View of consent is not the only game in town. Its rival is
the “Behavioral View,” according to which someone gives valid consent
is sufficient for valid consent. Our views differ in that Guerrero’s view focuses on what it is to
wrongfully act without a partner’s sexual consent, while my view is neutral on the question of
what constitutes culpability for sexual offences, focusing instead on a separate duty of due
diligence to investigate a partner’s consent. Outside of the context of discussing affirmative
consent policies, others have argued that someone can be culpable for committing a sexual
offence in light of an unreasonable belief in a partner’s consent. For example, see Lois
Pineau, “Date Rape: A Feminist Analysis,” Law and Philosophy 8 (1989): 217–43; David Arch-
ard, “The Mens Rea of Rape: Reasonableness and Culpable Mistakes,” in A Most Detestable
Crime: New Philosophical Essays on Rape. ed. K. Burgess-Jackson. (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1999), pp. 213–29; Marcia Baron, “I Thought She Consented,” Philosophical Issues
11 Social, Political and Legal Philosophy (2001): 1–32; Helen Power, “Towards a Redefinition
of the Mens Rea of Rape,” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 23 (2003): 379–404.
5. Kimberly Ferzan, “Consent, Culpability, and the Law of Rape,” Ohio State Journal of
Criminal Law 13 (2016): 397–439. On Ferzan’s view, a consent-giver must decide that another
person’s action is “okay with them.” As alternative answers that the Mental View should give
to the question of what constitutes consent to an action, Heidi Hurd proposes intending that
someone perform the action, Larry Alexander proposes intending to forswear objecting to the
action, Peter West proposes, at different points, desiring the action, mentally acquiescing to
the action and choosing the action, and Victor Tadros proposes attempting to communicate
that someone may perform this action (allowing that this attempt could be entirely mental if
someone thought that they were telepathic). Heidi Hurd, “The Moral Magic of Consent,”
Legal Theory 2 (1996): 121–46; Larry Alexander. “The Moral Magic of Consent II,” Legal The-
ory 2 (1996): 165–74; Larry Alexander, “The Ontology of Consent,” Analytic Philosophy
55 (2014): 102–13; Peter Westen, The Logic of Consent (Ashgate: Ashgate Publishing, 2004);
Victor Tadros, Wrongs and Crimes, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).
6. Ferzan, “Consent, Culpability and the Law of Rape,” p. 421.
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only if they have indicated with behavior that they have chosen to permit
the action in question.7 On that view, encounters without clear communi-
cation would be morally impermissible, and in previous work, I have pro-
vided a partial defense of affirmative consent policies on these grounds.8
So far, the debate over affirmative consent policies is yet to explore the
possibility that these policies might have a rationale that is acceptable to
adherents of both the Mental View and the Behavioral View. In this essay,
I articulate this independent rationale: each of us has a “Duty of Due Dili-
gence” to take adequate measures to investigate whether our sexual part-
ners are willing to engage in sexual activity. But on the assumption that
someone had adequate evidence that their partner is willing to have sex
only if their partner has clearly expressed this willingness, the Duty of Due
Diligence would imply that affirmative consent policies need only be
7. A proponent of the Behavioral View can further require that the consent-receiver suc-
cessfully interpret this behavior as indicating consent. The proponent can also hold that a
mental choice or intention is necessary for valid consent. For views that endorse the Behav-
ioral View, see Joel Feinberg, Harm to Self (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986); Pineau,
“Date Rape,”; Heidi Malm, “The Ontological Status of Consent and its Implications for the
Law on Rape,” Legal Theory 2 (1996): 147–64; David Archard, Sexual Consent (Oxford: West-
view Press, 1998); Baron, “I Thought She Consented”; Alan Wertheimer, Consent to Sexual
Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Joan McGregor, Is It Rape? On
Acquaintance Rape and Taking Women’s Consent Seriously (Ashgate: Ashgate Publishing Lim-
ited, 2005); Seana Shiffrin, “Promising, Intimate Relationships and Conventionalism,” Philo-
sophical Review 177 (2008): 481–524; Franklin Miller and Alan Wertheimer “Preface to a
Theory of Consent Transactions: Beyond Valid Consent,” in The Ethics of Consent: Theory
and Practice, ed. Franklin Miller and Alan Wertheimer (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2010), pp. 79–106; Japa Pallikkathayi, “The Possibility of Choice: Three Accounts of the Prob-
lem with Coercion,” Philosophers’ Imprint 11 (2011): 1–20; Govert Den Hartogh, “Can Con-
sent Be Presumed?” Journal of Applied Philosophy 28 (2011): 295–307; David Owens, Shaping
the Normative Landscape (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); Richard Healey, “The
Ontology of Consent: A Reply to Alexander,” Analytic Philosophy 56 (2015): 354–63; Tom
Dougherty, “Yes Means Yes: Consent as Communication,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 43
(2015): 224–53; Neil Manson, “Permissive Consent: A Robust Reason-Changing Account,”
Philosophical Studies 173 (2016): 3317–34.
8. One of the shortcomings of my previous discussion of affirmative consent policies was
that I failed to address the issue of the appropriate sanctions for violating these policies.
Dougherty, “Yes Means Yes.” While Ferzan appeals to the Mental View to provide her central
line of argument against affirmative consent policies rests, she also argues that proponents of
the Behavioral View should be worried about some of these policies, given that omissions
can constitute communication in certain circumstances. This argument would cause trouble
for policies that disallowed any omission to count as unambiguous communication, but not
for policies that only require unambiguous communication (whether by action or omission).
I return to this issue in Section V when discussing modifications of extant affirmative consent
policies. Ferzan, “Consent, Culpability and the Law of Rape,” p. 412.
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sanctioning behavior that is wrong in itself: the policies would sanction
people who have wrongfully failed to ascertain that their partners are will-
ing to engage in sexual activity. As long as these policies’ sanctions for this
behavior are suitably proportionate to its wrongfulness, this provides a
defense of these policies wherever that assumption holds. But by reflecting
on the exceptions where the assumption does not hold, the Duty of Due
Diligence suggests an alternative way of formulating sexual offence poli-
cies to achieve goals of affirmative consent policies: these policies could
simply codify an institutional analogue of the Duty of Due Diligence itself.
In other words, these policies could directly sanction someone for engag-
ing in sexual activity without adequately investigating that their partner
was willing to engage in this activity.
As proponents of the Mental View can accept that we each have the
Duty of Due Diligence, I intend to remain neutral on the debate between
that view and the Behavioral View. In other words, I do not aim to resolve
here what morally valid consent is. Also, as my interest concerns which
actions should be prohibited by laws and codes, I intend to remain neutral
on the orthogonal question of what constitutes culpability for the purposes
of punishing someone who engages in prohibited behavior. Everyone
agrees that someone can be culpable in virtue of knowingly engaging in
this behavior or in virtue of recklessly being aware that they are taking an
excessive risk of engaging in this behavior. But controversy breaks out over
when, if at all, it is appropriate to punish someone who does wrong negli-
gently. Roughly, someone does wrong negligently when they are unaware
that there is at least a significant risk that they are acting impermissibly,
but they ought to have been aware of this risk.9 While most people have
the intuition that we can at least sometimes be culpable for acting negli-
gently, some argue that this intuition misleads. For example, on the
9. Most theorists agree with Section 2.02 (2)(d) of the Model Penal Code (1985) in defin-
ing negligence in terms of inadvertently taking risks. However, others conceive of negligence
as covering some forms of advertent risk-taking. See Michael Moore and Heidi Hurd, “Pun-
ishing the Awkward, the Stupid, the Weak and the Selfish: The Culpability of Negligence,”
Criminal Law and Philosophy 5 (2011): 147–98, p. 150; Kenneth Simons, “When is Negligent
Inadvertence Culpable? Introduction to Symposium, Negligence in Criminal Law and
Morality,” Criminal Law and Philosophy 5 (2011): 97–114, at p. 106. Ferzan claims that “reck-
lessness is the default mens rea in the Model Penal Code,” and punishment of the negligent
runs against criminal law principles in her “Consent, Culpability and the Law of Rape,”
pp. 416, 427. Kenneth Simons notes that the Model Penal Code includes an offence for negli-
gent homicide in his “When is Negligent Inadvertence Culpable?” at p. 108.
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grounds that culpability always requires a choice to take risks, Larry Alex-
ander and Ferzan argue that “culpability-based criminal law will not
include liability for negligence.”10 Even among the majority who believe
that some forms of negligence ground culpability, there is further debate
about which forms of negligence do.11 Personally, I am sympathetic to the
claim that someone can be culpable for committing an offense out of
ignorance that results from their failing to take due care to ensure that
they do not commit this offense. If that claim is right, then culpably violat-
ing the Duty of Due Diligence could make someone culpably negligent for
engaging in nonconsensual sex. But I will not insist on this claim, as it is
unnecessary for my central argument. Even if it turned out that only
knowledge or recklessness are grounds of culpability, someone could still
be appropriately punished for knowingly or recklessly failing to carry out
the Duty of Due Diligence.
II. AFFIRMATIVE CONSENT
Let us start by looking more closely at the details of affirmative consent
policies, using the previously quoted policy of Yale as our guide. It con-
tains a characteristic feature of an affirmative consent policy, namely that
10. Larry Alexander and Kimberly Ferzan, Crime and Culpability: A Theory of the Criminal
Law (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2009), at pp. 71, 85. See also Matt King, “The
Problem with Negligence,” Social Theory and Practice 35 (2009): 577–95.
11. Some hold that negligence is also culpable only when it can be traced back to a prior
culpable choice or act. Holly Smith, “Culpable Ignorance,” Philosophical Review 92 (1983):
543–71; Michael Zimmerman, “Negligence and Moral Responsibility,” Nous 20 (1986):
199–218; Gideon Rosen, “Culpability and Ignorance,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society
103 (2003): 61–84; Neil Levy, “Culpable Ignorance and Moral Responsibility: A Reply to
Fitzpatrick,” Ethics 119 (2009): 729–41; Moore and Hurd, “Punishing the Awkward.” Others
take a more expansive view of culpable negligence. Victor Tadros, Kenneth Simons, and Wil-
liam Fitzpatrick hold that negligence is also culpable when it results from certain character
flaws; H.L.A. Hart and Steven Garvey hold that negligence is also culpable when it results
from a failure to exercise a capacity, and Joseph Raz holds that negligence is also culpable
when it results from rational malfunctioning. Victor Tadros, Criminal Responsibility (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 254; Kenneth Simons, “Punishment and Blame for Culpable
Indifference,” Inquiry 58 (2014): 143–67; William Fitzpatrick, “Moral Responsibility and Nor-
mative Ignorance: Answering a New Skeptical Challenge” Ethics 118 (2008): 589–613;
H.L.A. Hart, “Negligence, Mens Rea and Criminal Responsibility,” in his Punishment and
Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968); Steven
Garvey, “What’s Wrong with Involuntary Manslaughter?” Texas Law Review 85 (2006):
333–83; Joseph Raz, “Responsibility and the Negligence Standard,” Oxford Journal of Legal
Studies 30 (2010): 1–18.
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consent cannot be inferred from the mere fact that someone is not
expressly refusing sex. (“Consent cannot be inferred from the absence of a
‘no’.”) Instead, someone must actively indicate their willingness to have
sex. Yale’s policy is flexible in one respect about the form that this behav-
ior may take, as it flags that the behavior need not be verbal. As a result,
body language, gestures, or actions could count as ways by which we
communicate consent. That is a sensible feature of the policy, given that
we communicate nonverbally in various contexts. We frown to show that
we disagree with someone’s proposal, and we shuffle along a public trans-
port seat to indicate that we are happy for another passenger to sit next to
us. But there is also a respect in which the policy is demanding: it requires
that this communication be clear or unambiguous. So if someone mum-
bled or if they could reasonably be interpreted in more than one way, then
there would be no consent according to the policy.
Affirmative consent polices can be seen as the latest instances of a pro-
gressive trend away from the idea that victims have responsibilities to
resist sexual assault. Against the historical backdrop of policies that
implied that no offence had been committed unless a victim resisted—and
polices that recognized an offence only when a victim “resisted to the
utmost”—affirmative consent policies take the stance that a victim does
not even have to indicate that they are unwilling to have sex. Instead, the
default is always that it is impermissible to make sexual contact with
someone, unless that person has clearly indicated that it is permissible.
But in trying to protect individuals’ sexual autonomy, affirmative con-
sent policies catch in their wake mutually welcome encounters like the
following:
Unexpressed. A and B are both willing for B to sexually penetrate
A. However, A and B are inexperienced and nervous and so they do not
attempt to communicate that they are both willing. While B thinks that,
most likely, A is willing for B to penetrate A, B is not fully confident
about this. However, B is apprehensive about asking, and worried that
doing so will indicate inexperience. Moreover, B assumes that A will
expressly refuse if A is unwilling. B penetrates A.
If this interaction occurred on Yale’s campus, then the campus code
would imply that B has made sexual contact without A’s consent, even
though A was willing for the sexual encounter to take place. Of course, A’s
96 Philosophy & Public Affairslic ff irs
willingness may make it the case that A is less likely to make a complaint.
But if the relationship between A and B took a turn for the worse, then A
would be within their rights to make this complaint. Similarly, as Yale’s
code requires unambiguous communication, it implies that an offence has
also been committed in a case like this:
Ambiguity. C attempts to communicate that they are willing for D to
sexually penetrate C. But because C is inexperienced and nervous, C’s
attempts to communicate are ambiguous. While D thinks that, most
likely, C is willing for D to penetrate C, D is not fully confident about
this. However, D is apprehensive about asking, and worried that doing
so will indicate inexperience. Moreover, D assumes that C will refuse if
C is unwilling. D penetrates C.
As C has failed to communicate unambiguously, Yale’s policy implies that
D lacks C’s sexual consent, despite C having attempted to communicate
their willingness for the sexual activity to take place.
These implications call into question affirmative consent policies, as
these cases do not seem to involve serious sexual assault. Yet, sexual con-
sent policies’ gravitas derives from their role in preventing and sanctioning
sexual assaults. A paradigm of such an assault is not exemplified in the
Unexpressed and Ambiguity cases, but in a case like this:
Unwilling. E is willing to engage in minor sexual activity with F, but is
unwilling for F to penetrate E. But because E is inexperienced and ner-
vous, E does not express to F the types of sexual activity that E is willing
to take part in. While F thinks that, most likely, E is willing for F to
penetrate E, F is not fully confident about this. However, F is apprehen-
sive about asking, and worried that doing so will indicate inexperience.
Moreover, F assumes that E will refuse if E is unwilling. F penetrates E.
In this case, E is subject to sexual penetration against their will. This is a
gross violation of their personal autonomy, and will no doubt also be a
distressing experience that leads to serious psychological harm.
By contrasting the Unwilling case with the Ambiguity and Unexpressed
case, I aim to make a point about which types of sexual offence, if any, have
been committed. It is worth stressing that these points do not concern the
agent’s culpability for their behavior. As the cases are sketched, B, D, and F
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all have a similar epistemic situation. As an agent’s culpability depends on
her epistemic situation, it may be that each agent is culpable to the same
degree. But it does not follow that the conduct of each is morally equivalent.
F has penetrated E against E’s will, while neither B nor D has penetrated
anyone against their will. Penetrating someone against their will is a distinc-
tively serious wrong. We would miss this feature if we evaluated each agent’s
conduct purely from their own evidential situation. This evaluation would
miss the differing effects on the victim, and these effects bear on the extent
to which the victim is wronged.
So the Unwilling case exemplifies the most serious forms of sexual
offence. But to sanction a sexual offence in the Unwilling case, an affirma-
tive consent policy is not necessary. Because E is not willing for F to
penetrate E, we can explain the wrong of F’s conduct in terms of E’s men-
tal states. For example, the proposed revisions to the Model Penal Code
would deem this interaction nonconsensual in light of the absence of E’s
“willingness to engage in a specific act of sexual penetration or sexual con-
tact.”12 So the worry that affirmative consent policies are overly broad
would be compounded by a worry that these policies are unnecessary to
sanction serious sexual assaults.
III. THE DUTY OF DUE DILIGENCE
Even those of us who are broadly supportive of affirmative consent policies
should acknowledge a central insight at the heart of this critique: there is a
clear moral difference between the Unexpressed and Ambiguity cases, on the
one hand, and the Unwilling case, on the other. Whatever we think of B’s
and D’s behavior in the Unexpressed and Ambiguity cases, F commits a
much more serious wrong in the Unwilling case. To deny this is to implausi-
bly maintain that the seriousness of a wrong does not depend on the victim’s
attitudes toward the encounter, the victim’s experience during the encoun-
ter, and the effects that the encounter has on the victim. We will return to
this point later, but for now, let us note that if a wrong has been committed
in the Unexpressed and Ambiguity cases, then it is not the most serious type
of sexual offense, and any policy’s sanctions should reflect this.
This point is well taken, but it does not by itself show that an affirma-
tive consent policy is unjustifiable on the grounds that the policy sanctions
12. Moringo, “Updated ‘Consent’ Definition.”
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morally permissible behavior. There remains the possibility that B and D
have still committed a more minor offence.13 Indeed, I will argue that this
is the case.
I suggest that we should be perturbed by how B and D act in these
cases—we would hope that no one we cared about acted in this way, or
was in the position of A and C, for that matter. When we consider what is
awry with each agent’s conduct, the natural candidate is that the agent
has proceeded without ascertaining that their partner is willing to have
sex. While their partner has not clearly indicated that they are willing, the
agent does not know that their partner consents. For B or D to know that
A and C are willing to engage in sexual activity, A and C would need to
express this willingness through behavior. In turn, each consent-receiver’s
failure to ascertain that their partner is willing suggests that the consent-
receiver is not acting in a way that expresses a sufficient concern with
whether their partner is willing. If the consent-receiver acted in a way that
expressed more concern, then they would have made greater efforts to
establish whether their partner is willing to have sex. Following this line of
a thought, we should conclude that the consent-receiver has acted imper-
missibly by failing to express proper concern for the other person’s
authority over their personal boundaries.
To develop this idea, let us start with the big picture thought that
responsible moral agency does not just involve acting in ways that we
believe are morally permissible. It also involves aiming at forming accu-
rate beliefs about which actions are morally permissible. This would plau-
sibly involve thinking a priori about what morality requires of us, as well
as empirically investigating the effects of our actions. That big picture
thought applies to everything we morally ought to do. So if we have a duty
to preserve the Great Barrier Reef for the sake of its intrinsic value, then
we ought to consider whether our actions contribute to coral-bleaching.
This impersonal investigative duty would not be owed to anyone in partic-
ular. However, when our actions affect other people, we do not just have
13. This is a point that an advocate of the Behavioral View should agree with. The Behav-
ioral View advocate should hold that in order for A and C to validly consent it must be the
case that A and C both decided to permit sexual activity, and that they have expressed this
decision. Having taken this position, the Behavioral View advocate is free to hold that it is
wrong to engage in sexual activity with someone who has decided to consent without expres-
sing this decision, but it is much worse to engage in sexual activity with someone against
their will.
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an impersonal investigative duty to discover what we ought to do. We also
have specific investigative duties owed to these individuals. If your action
might harm Jane or infringe her rights, then you owe it to Jane to gather
evidence about whether your action does so. More generally, for every
duty we have to respect another person’s rights, we have a correlative duty
to investigate whether our action would respect their rights. This is not
just to say that someone who had failed to carry out these investigations
would have a bad character. It is also to say that these investigations are
required of them. If they asked us whether to investigate the moral status
of their actions, then we would advise them that they ought to do so, and
if they seemed reluctant, then we would demand that they did.
We can apply this idea to consent. Suppose an agent is considering
whether to perform an action for which they need another person’s con-
sent. The agent would have an investigative duty to ascertain whether the
other person is consenting. The agent also ought to find out what the
other person is consenting to. A plausible ground of this duty is that its
breach is a form of disrespect. As Peter Westen puts the point,
Defendants can inflict two kinds of wrongful harms upon victims of
offences of non-consent: the primary harm of subjecting them to con-
duct without their having subjectively and voluntarily chosen it for
themselves; and the lesser, dignitary harm of manifesting a readiness or
willingness to subject them to that primary harm.14
In this context, a dignitary harm is the harm of being treated
disrespectfully—in a way that subjects the victim to an indignity. While Wes-
ten focuses on a dignitary harm of manifesting a willingness to subject some-
one to nonconsensual activity, the dignitary harm would plausibly also be
inflicted by an agent who acts as though they are willing to subject this per-
son to nonconsensual activity.15 Now if an agent fails to investigate properly
whether a partner is willing to engage in this activity, then the agent would
be acting as though they are willing to subject this person to nonconsensual
activity. So this agent would have a duty to investigate, assuming that the
agent plans on performing the action for which the consent is required. If
instead the agent chooses to walk away and do nothing, then they would
14. Westen, Logic of Consent, p. 161.
15. Thanks to an Associate Editor for this point.
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have no duty to investigate whether the other person is consenting. So the
investigative duty has a disjunctive form: it requires either inaction or inves-
tigation. To capture this idea, we should formulate the duty along the follow-
ing lines:
Duty of Due Diligence
If X needs Y’s consent to perform action A, then X has a duty of due dil-
igence owed to Y regarding X’s performance of A. X avoids breaching
this duty if and only if
Either (i) X refrains from performing A;
Or (ii) X has adequately investigated that Y has decided that they are
willing for X to perform A
I include the qualification “regarding X’s performance of A” to acknowl-
edge that there may be other ways that X could disrespect Y by failing to
take due care toward Y.16 Perhaps, there is room for further debate about
the details of how the principle should be formulated. But the central idea
is that for any action for which someone’s consent is required, the princi-
ple gives the relevant agent a Duty of Due Diligence. The agent breaches
this duty by performing the action without having adequately investigated
whether the person is willing for them to perform this action.
The phrase “adequately investigated” is deliberately vague, in light of
the fact that the appropriate forms of investigation will be context-sensi-
tive. This would depend on whether we are dealing with “low stakes” con-
sent, such as consent to minor uses of each other’s property, or “high
stakes” consent, such as invasive medical surgery. What counts as ade-
quate investigation would also depend on the costs of investigating. Sup-
pose an agent has good evidence about whether the other person is
consenting. If it will be onerous for her to investigate further, then she
may count as having adequately investigated the matter. But if further
investigation were costless, then the agent would need to carry it out.
16. Thanks to an Associate Editor for pointing out that this qualification is needed
because an agent can treat someone disrespectfully by disregarding whether they consent to
a possible action, even if the agent does not end up performing the action.
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Defenders of the Mental View of consent can posit the Duty of Due Dil-
igence. Like the Behavioral View, the Mental View only concerns what it
takes for someone to give valid consent that releases someone from a pri-
mary duty not to interfere with another’s person or property. By contrast,
the Duty of Due Diligence is a secondary duty governing the steps that
someone should take to ensure that they are complying with the primary
duty. One could hold that valid consent is mental, and still hold that we
have a further duty to adequately investigate that the other person has the
requisite mental states. Indeed, if anything, positing the Duty of Due Dili-
gence helps the Mental View in the debate with the Behavioral View in
the following respect. In that debate, the Behavioral View is sometimes
motivated on the grounds that consent must be public to provide the
consent-receiver with epistemic access to the consent.17 But this motiva-
tion is undermined by positing the Duty of Due Diligence. If the consent-
receiver complied with this duty, then this compliance would improve
their epistemic access to the consent. So insofar as we think it a virtue of a
set of normative principles governing consent that these principles make
it more likely that all parties have common knowledge of whether each is
willing to permit an encounter, this can be realized by including the Duty
of Due Diligence within this set, without embracing the Behavioral View.
Let me clarify my proposal by comparing it with a different idea.
I noted at the outset that in addressing which actions should be prohibited
by laws or codes, I am remaining neutral on the controversy over what it
takes for someone to be culpable for performing a prohibited action.
Engaging in that controversy, some people have argued that if an agent
unreasonably believes that their partner consents to sex, then the agent
can be appropriately punished for sexual assault. Their proposal is moti-
vated by a concern for cases like Unwilling, in which F commits the sexual
offence of penetrating E against their will, while believing that E is willing.
The proposal would be that if F holds this belief in E’s consent negligently,
then F is culpable for the sexual offence and may be punished. While this
argument resonates with many people’s intuitions, it depends on a contro-
versial view of culpability. As we saw, some philosophers deny that negli-
gence is an appropriate ground of culpability for punishment.18 We need
17. Healey “The Ontology of Consent,”; Dougherty, “Yes Means Yes.”
18. In the context of critiquing affirmative consent policies, Ferzan criticizes this proposal
at length in her “Consent, Culpability and the Law of Rape.”
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not take any stance on this controversy when endorsing the Duty of Due
Diligence as a duty that we owe to each other. By endorsing this duty,
we are taking a stance on when someone has behaved in a morally
acceptable way, and when their behavior is morally impermissible. As the
permissibility of an action is distinct from the agent’s culpability for per-
forming this action, we are not thereby taking a stance on when someone
is behavior is culpable. As a result, the Duty of Due Diligence is acceptable
even to theorists who take a narrow view of culpability, as grounded only
in either knowledge or recklessness.
IV. A NEW FOUNDATION FOR AFFIRMATIVE CONSENT POLICIES
Let us take stock. We noted that affirmative consent policies imply that
offences have been committed in the Unexpressed and Ambiguity cases.
So we looked for plausible wrongs committed by the relevant agents, and
this led us to posit the Duty of Due Diligence. Because these agents
infringe that duty, affirmative consent policies would be sanctioning
wrongdoers in the Unexpressed and Ambiguity cases. Does that mean we
have reached a normative foundation for these policies?
It does not. Carrying out the Duty of Due Diligence does not require
expressive behavior on the part of the consent-giver. Consider the follow-
ing case:
Distraction. Anya emails her friend Brittney to ask if she can borrow
Brittney’s car for the rest of the day. Brittney thinks that this is fine with
her. But before Brittney can write an email in response, she gets dis-
tracted by a commotion in her office. While Brittney is attending to the
commotion, Camila sneakily writes an email response from Brittney’s
account, saying that it is fine to use the car, and signs it “Brittney.”
Anya reads that email and borrows the car.
Brittney has decided to consent to Anya’s action. In addition, Anya has
carried out her Duty of Due Diligence, by adequately investigating
whether Brittney is willing for her to take the car. Anya has a justified
belief that Brittney has indicated that she is happy for Anya to use the car.
However, Brittney has not indicated that she is willing for Anya to use the
car, because she was distracted before she could do so. This shows that a
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consent-giver’s expressive behavior is not necessary for a consent-receiver
to discharge their Duty of Due Diligence.
Even so, this result holds because of special features of the Distraction
case. This case involves consent to the use of impersonal property. There are
at least two distinctive features of this type of consent. First, this is a fairly
low-stakes type of consent. Second, a consent-giver may use the property at
distance from the consent-receiver. Together, these features make it appro-
priate for the consent-receiver to investigate the other person’s willingness
through email. Email’s considerable convenience outweighs its slight unrelia-
bility. Requiring Anya to visit Brittney at the office or even to give her a call
would be over the top. And even those methods might not foil Camila if she
were Brittney’s identical twin, or able to impersonate Brittney’s voice…
Contrast this with sexual consent. In a sexual encounter, an agent is in
close proximity to their partner, and so at least typically an agent’s ade-
quate investigation could not be complete without their sexual partner
engaging in communicative behavior that was clear in the circumstances.
Here, it is relevant that sexual consent is a paradigm of high-stakes con-
sent, and this feature increases the investigatory burden on sexual part-
ners to establish each other’s willingness to have sex. This burden should
be understood in terms of the type of evidence that they are required to
seek. The agent would need to have found clear and unambiguous evi-
dence of their partner’s willingness to have sex. In addition, as Jennifer
Lackey has argued, the agent would need to receive this evidence from
first-hand testimony from their partner; relying on third-parties’ testimony
would be inappropriate, given the stakes involved.19
This is not to deny an evidentiary role for background circumstances.
After all, every piece of communicative behavior is dependent for its
meaning on the context in which it takes place. Even an utterance of “I
want to have sex with you right now!” can only express sexual consent
because of the background conventions that govern the English language.
Moreover, the appropriate interpretation of implicit or nonverbal behavior
is sensitive to the relationship between the communicants as well as their
prior interactions with each other. For example, if two men have recently
met on a smartphone app that is exclusively used for facilitating casual
sexual encounters, then that evidence will bear on how to interpret their
19. Jennifer Lackey argues for this claim in her “Sexual Consent and Epistemic Agency,”
in Applied Epistemology, ed. Jennifer Lackey (Oxford University Press) (forthcoming).
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subsequent communications with each other. Similarly, if it is “a central
tenet of your religion that sex should take place only in the context of a
marriage, which you have embraced since childhood, and you frequently
speak about how your religious beliefs are central to your identity as a
person,” then this would bear on how to interpret whether you are con-
senting to sex with any particular utterance.20 In general, discharging
one’s Duty of Due Diligence requires taking into account all the available
evidence, including background context.
While the importance of sexual consent counts toward increasing the
investigatory burden, this burden also has to take into account the costs of
investigating. Some critics of affirmative consent policies object that these
policies would usher in a drab sexual culture, in which sexual encounters
have lost their spontaneity and thrill. The merits of this criticism are
debatable, however. On the one hand, these costs seem relatively minor
when compared to the costs of mistakes. Moreover, to the extent that
someone has competent social skills, and can adeptly interpret and signal
verbal and nonverbal cues, this person will be able to find out whether
their partner is willing to have sex with them, without ruining the
moment. The costs of awkwardness are born by those who have not devel-
oped these social skills, yet it is precisely these people who are most at
risk of making mistakes about whether their partners are consenting. For
them, there is more to be said for erring on the side of caution rather than
excitement (and we might speculate that novices’ sexual encounters are
often going to involve a certain amount of awkwardness anyway). As such,
concerns about unexciting sexual encounters give us little reason to deny
that adequate investigation would involve taking reasonable steps to
assure oneself to a high degree that one’s sexual partner is consenting.
What this suggests is that much of the time an assumption like the fol-
lowing would hold:
Investigation/Expression Assumption. When engaging in a sexual
encounter, a consent-receiver discharges their duty of due diligence
only if the consent-giver has positively and unambiguously indicated
that they agree to engage in this encounter throughout its duration. A
consent-receiver has not adequately investigated this agreement if they
are relying only on an absence of a “no.”
20. Lackey, “Sexual Consent.”
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That assumption is deliberately formulated in the language of Yale Univer-
sity’s policy to show how the assumption, in combination with the Duty of
Due Diligence, would ensure that the policy only prohibited wrongful
behavior.
V. TWO REVISIONS TO AFFIRMATIVE CONSENT POLICIES
The foregoing constitutes a defense for implementing affirmative consent
policies like Yale’s in cases where the Investigation/Expression Assump-
tion holds. But our discussion suggests two possible revisions that we
might like to make to these policies.
The first possible revision concerns the fact that it is questionable
whether the Investigation/Expression Assumption does hold universally.
The most plausible counterexamples are sexual encounters within the con-
text of established long-term relationships. Suppose, two spouses have
negotiated an understanding that one person will explicitly object to sexual
contact if they are unwilling to engage in it. This person is an assertive and
confident member of groups that are privileged in terms of social power,
and there is a solid bedrock of trust between the spouses. Would their part-
ner be carrying out their Duty of Due Diligence by being guided by their
omitting to articulate an unwillingness to engage in sex? We might be in
two minds about this question. On the one hand, we might feel some pull
toward thinking that as there is a chance that any agent is uncharacteristi-
cally reticent, their partner’s due diligence always requires looking for
unambiguous behavior that indicates their willingness to engage in a spe-
cific encounter. That thought would lead to discomfort with the idea that
one can ever responsibly infer this willingness from an omission. On the
other hand, there is a countervailing pull toward thinking that there are
versions of this case in which the partner could know what this person was
thinking in light of their omission. But if it really is true that they know that
their sexual partner is willing to permit and engage in the sexual encounter,
then it would seem that no further investigation is required.
Let us suppose for the sake of argument that in cases like these, one
partner could know of the other’s willingness because of their omission.
This creates a problem for appealing to the Duty of Due Diligence to sup-
port an affirmative consent policy like Yale’s. As Yale’s policy does not rec-
ognize omission as constituting communication, and the policy is part of a
general code that applies to sex within established relationships as well as
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casual hook-ups, the policy would prohibit the encounter if it happened on
campus. If the encounter is not wrong, then the policy looks overly broad.
Here is one way to narrow it. The policy could define consent as follows:
Sexual activity requires consent, which is defined as unambiguous and
voluntary agreement to engage in specific sexual activity throughout a
sexual encounter.
Then, the policy could add the following guidance on how to interpret the
definition when applying it in practice:
In nearly all cases—including all sexual activity between individuals
who are not regular sexual partners, and all sexual activity between
individuals who are partially intoxicated—this willingness cannot be
inferred from the absence of a “no”; a clear “yes,” verbal or otherwise,
is necessary.
As consent is defined in terms of unambiguous agreement, this definition
allows that the married couple can consent in virtue of an omission, so
long as in the circumstances that omission constitutes unambiguous
agreement to engage in sex. Still, if a policy used this definition to prohibit
nonconsensual sexual activity, then the policy would be restrictive enough
to penalize individuals who relied on inadequate evidence. Further, the
guidance explicitly states that relying on an absence of refusal is insuffi-
cient in casual hook-ups—the types of interaction that concern propo-
nents of affirmative consent policies.
The second possible revision concerns the language with which the
policy is phrased. Extant affirmative consent policies frame sexual offences
in terms of the absence of affirmative consent. But if a campus code aims
to sanction people who depart from the Duty of Due Diligence, then the
code could simply codify that duty itself:
SEXUAL ACTIVITY WITHOUT DUE CARE. An actor is guilty of “sexual activity
without due care,” if the actor knowingly engages in sexual activity with
someone, without adequately investigating that this person is willing to
engage in this sexual activity. The actor’s investigation is adequate only
when it is unambiguous that this person agrees to engage in this spe-
cific sexual activity.
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Again, this definition can be supplemented with guidance:
In nearly all cases—including all sexual activity between individuals
who are not regular sexual partners, and all sexual activity between
individuals who are partially intoxicated—this agreement cannot be
inferred from the absence of a “no”; a clear “yes,” verbal or otherwise,
is necessary.21
As that offense does not mention sexual consent, the policy would be
reframing an affirmative consent policy as a policy requiring due care in
sexual relations.
At this point, someone might object that we are no longer defending
affirmative consent policies: we have simply changed the subject, and we
are now proposing alternative policies that sanction a lack of due care in
sexual relations. In response to this objection, I agree that a switch to SEX-
UAL ACTIVITY WITHOUT DUE CARE would at least amount to reframing extant
affirmative consent policies. All the same, there remain important similari-
ties in terms of the type of conduct required by the extant and revised pol-
icies. Like Yale University’s policy, SEXUAL ACTIVITY WITHOUT DUE CARE
requires that it must be unambiguous that one’s partner agrees to engage
in sexual activity. Also, the guidance makes clear that this at least typically
requires a clear “yes,” verbal or otherwise. Do these similarities mean that
we continue to categorize SEXUAL ACTIVITY WITHOUT DUE CARE as an “affir-
mative consent policy”? Or do the dissimilarities mean that we should
consider it only a descendant of affirmative consent policies? I find it hard
to believe that much hangs on which answer we give. The key substantive
question is how to frame a sexual offence policy so that it prohibits
21. It has been suggested to me that we might prefer a policy prohibiting sexual activity
without due care to a policy prohibiting sexual activity without affirmative consent on the
grounds that the former policy might lead to better investigative practices. It might lead the
adjudication of complaints to focus on the conduct of the person accused of the offence.
(What did they do to investigate?) Meanwhile, an affirmative consent policy might lead inves-
tigators to focus on the conduct of the complainant. (Did the complainant clearly communi-
cate?) This would be a welcome consequence, as we should minimize how distressing
investigations are for victims of sexual offences. But it is not clear from the armchair which
investigatory practices would emerge from the implementation of either rule, and it is hard
to believe that under either policy, a complainant would entirely escape the need to provide
evidence.
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behavior that is morally wrong. In response to that question, I am offering
SEXUAL ACTIVITY WITHOUT DUE CARE as a candidate for a policy that can be
defended on the grounds that it prohibits behavior that is morally wrong
in virtue of violating the Duty of Due Diligence.
VI. DIFFERENTIATING SEXUAL OFFENCES
To complete our discussion, we should turn to a topic that we have not
yet addressed—the appropriate penalties for violating offences. A defensi-
ble sexual offence policy must sanction an offence with punishment that
is proportionate to the gravity of the offence. Here, we should recall our
earlier point that the misconduct in cases like Ambiguity and Unexpressed
is significantly less serious than the misconduct in a case like Unwilling.
Even if someone is wronged by their partner failing to adequately investi-
gate their willingness to engage in sexual activity, they would be much
more gravely wronged by sexual activity that was against their will.
Accordingly, the sanction for sexual activity without carrying out due dili-
gence would have to be significantly more lenient than the sanction for
imposing sexual activity on someone against their will.
This means that an appropriately nuanced sexual offence policy cannot
contain only one offence.22 Instead, it must recognize important grada-
tions in sexual misconduct. I suggest that a policy should posit a “greater
offence” of engaging in sexual activity against another person’s will. But it
should also posit a “lesser offence” of engaging in sexual activity without
one’s partner unambiguously indicating their willingness. How we view
each offence will depend on which position we take in the debate between
the Mental View and the Behavioral View. If we adopt the Mental View,
then we will consider the greater offence as the offence of imposing non-
consensual sex, and we will consider the lesser offence as a separate
offence, for example, SEXUAL ACTIVITY WITHOUT DUE CARE. Meanwhile, if we
adopt the Behavioral View, then we will consider the lesser offence as the
offence of imposing nonconsensual sex. But even so, we should still con-
sider the greater offence as a more serious offence for example,
22. A related problem with a single offence is that it is likely either to over-punish some
offenders or under-punish other offenders. See Ferzan, “Consent, Culpability and the Law of
Rape,” pp. 433–5.
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“aggravated non-consensual sexual activity” or “sexual activity against
someone’s will.”23 These points notwithstanding, it should be common
ground between the Behavioral View and the Mental View that a policy
should distinguish at least two offences that are sanctioned with different
amounts of punishment.
Once these offences are distinguished, we should acknowledge that there
are various ways that offenders could be punished. First, an offender’s
behavior could comprise the lesser offence, without comprising the greater
offence. That is the lesson we learn from considering cases like Ambiguity
and Unexpressed, in which both partners willingly engage in sexual activity,
without adequately communicating their willingness. Second, even if an
offender’s behavior constitutes both offences, it is a further question
whether the offender is culpable for each offence. Importantly, it may be
that the offender is not culpable in the same way for each offence. Suppose
the offender knows that their partner has not clearly communicated their
willingness to engage in sexual activity, and consequently is aware that
there is a significant risk that their partner is unwilling to engage in this
activity. The offender would be culpable for the lesser offence in virtue of
knowingly committing this offence but would be culpable for the greater
offence in virtue of recklessly committing that offence.
What about someone who commits the greater offence of having sex with
someone against their will, but does so negligently? In particular, what is the
appropriate punishment for someone who mistakenly believes that their
partner consents as the result of culpably failing to carry out their Duty of
Due Diligence? Our answer will depend on where we stand in the debate I
bracketed at the outset concerning when, if ever, negligence is a ground of
culpability. Some people deny that negligence is ever a ground of culpability.
They will say that the negligent offender cannot be appropriately punished
for the greater offence of having sex against someone’s will, although they
can be appropriately punished for the lesser offence of having sex with
someone who has not unambiguously indicated their willingness to have
sex. Others think that negligence can be grounds for punishment when the
negligence can be traced to a previous moral failure for which the agent is
culpable. Along these lines, consider the following principle:
23. Plausibly, there are other aggravating conditions. For example, the proposed revisions
to the Model Penal Code include a more serious offence of “aggravated rape” which is com-
mitted when for example, a lethal weapon is used to coerce.
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PROTECTIVE DUTY NEGLIGENCE. If a duty, D, has the purpose of providing an
actor with information that would prevent the actor from inadvertently
committing a wrong, W, then the actor is negligently culpable for commit-
ting W as the result of ignorance that resulted from the actor culpably
breaching D.
This principle applies to an agent who is culpable for failing to follow the
precautionary rule, for example, because the agent knowingly or recklessly
failed to follow the rule.24 The principle states that this agent thereby
becomes culpably negligent for unwittingly committing the wrong that the
rule aims to prevent. The rationale would be that by culpably disregarding
the precautionary rule for avoiding ignorance, the actor would assume
responsibility for mishaps that resulted from their ignorance. Plausibly,
the actor would be less culpable for the wrong than they would be were
they acting recklessly, by advertently posing a risk of committing the
wrong.25 If so, the actor may be punished less for negligently committing
the wrong than for doing so recklessly. This strikes me as a plausible view
of culpable negligence. But it is not universally shared and I will not argue
for it here.26 Instead, I will merely point out how this principle bears on
our topic of culpability for the aforementioned greater and lesser sexual
offences. The principle would imply that someone could be culpably neg-
ligent for the greater offence of sex against someone’s will in virtue of
knowingly or recklessly committing the lesser offence of sex with someone
who has not unambiguously indicated that they are willing to have sex.
24. In theory, it might be possible that an actor is negligently culpable for failing to follow
a precautionary rule in virtue of culpably failing to follow yet another precautionary rule, but
it is hard to imagine this circumstance arising.
25. Holly Smith argues that this is a general feature of culpability, and Kenneth Simons
notes that in the Model Penal Code “[n]egligent homicide is the lowest level of homicide,
below reckless manslaughter, which is below murder (requiring purpose, knowledge, or
extreme indifference).” Holly Smith, “Negligence,” in The International Encyclopedia of Ethics,
ed. Hugh LaFollette (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013), pp. 3565–3571. Simons, “When is Negli-
gent Inadvertence Culpable?” at p. 108.
26. Endorsing a similar view of culpability, Moore and Hurd note the worry that substitut-
ing culpability for knowing violating a rule for culpability for a different offence “smacks of
strict liability, for it substitutes for a serious mental state (the contemplation that one will
cause death) a potentially less culpable mental state (the contemplation that one’s conduct
violates a rule).” Moore and Hurd, “Punishing the Awkward,” pp. 186–91. Ferzan pursues this
line of objection against negligence-based rationales for affirmative consent policies. Ferzan,
“Culpability, Consent and the Law of Rape,” p. 424.
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This completes our discussion of issues of substance. I will end by con-
sidering a terminological question concerning how to use the word “con-
sent.” This issue is simple for proponents of the Mental View—they
should use “consent” only to pick out a certain mental attitude. But our
discussion implies that the terminological issue is more nuanced for the
Behavioral View. While cases like Unexpressed and Ambiguity involve sex-
ual misconduct, this misconduct is not among the most serious sexual
offences. (In particular, it is less serious than sexual activity against some-
one’s will, as exemplified by the Unwilling case.) This means that if a
Behavioral View proponent adopts a single definition of consent as affir-
mative consent, then they cannot say that nonconsensual sexual activity is
sufficient for the most serious type of sexual offence. To avoid this result, I
suggest that proponents of the Behavioral View do not talk simply about
consent, but instead talk both of mental consent and affirmative consent.
They could then say that engaging in sexual activity without affirmative
consent is sufficient for committing a sexual offence but engaging in sex-
ual activity without mental consent is sufficient for committing a particu-
larly serious type of sexual offence.
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